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Dai Zhen’s Criticism and Misunderstanding of Zhu Xi’s Moral Theory

Zheng, Zemian

Dao : a journal of comparative philosophy, 2015-09, Vol.14 (3), p.433-449 [同儕審閱期刊]

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題名:
Dai Zhen’s Criticism and Misunderstanding of Zhu Xi’s Moral Theory
著者: Zheng, Zemian
主題: 1600-1899 Qing dynasty period ; 900-1299 Song dynasty period ; asceticism ; Chinese ; Chinese literature ; Communication failure ; Confucianism ; Dai Zhen ; desire ; Education ; Ethics ; human nature ; intuition ; moral philosophy ; Morality ; Nature ; Non-Western Philosophy ; Philosophy ; Philosophy of Religion ; prose ; Religious Studies ; Zhu Xi
所屬期刊: Dao : a journal of comparative philosophy, 2015-09, Vol.14 (3), p.433-449
描述: D ai Zhen 戴震 criticizes Song-Ming 宋明 Neo-Confucianism, especially Z hu Xi’s 朱熹 dichotomy between principle ( li 理) and desires ( yu 欲) and his claim that principle is received from Heaven and completely embodied in the heart/mind, as if Zhu advocates asceticism and ultra-intuitionism. This criticism culminates in the accusation of “using principle as a means of killing or persecuting people.” In this paper, I argue that D ai Zhen misunderstands Z hu Xi’s moral theory and does not do him justice. At some point Dai’s criticism is similar to the utilitarian criticism of deontology. However, more interesting are Dai’s unique ideas, especially his arguments for desires that covertly appeal to the immanent-monist trends of thought in the Ming-Qing 明清 period. His own ethical enterprise lies in dismissing Song Confucians’ notion of ethics as revealing principles a priori , and then establishing criteria or procedures that enable common moral deliberation.
出版者: Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands
語言: 英文
識別號: ISSN: 1540-3009
ISSN: 1569-7274
EISSN: 1569-7274
DOI: 10.1007/s11712-015-9454-x
資源來源: OmniFile full text select
SpringerLink (Online service)

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Dai Zhen’s Criticism and Misunderstanding of Zhu Xi’s Moral Theory

Zheng, Zemian

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