skip to main content
訪客
個人書架
我的帳戶
登出
登入
This feature requires javascript
檢索首頁
圖書館首頁
電子期刊
引用參考文獻查詢
指定參考書查詢
新書通報
標籤查詢
線上輔助
語言:
English
繁體中文
This feature required javascript
This feature requires javascript
Primo Search
館藏+文章
館藏+文章
館藏
查館藏
文章
查文章
機構典藏
機構典藏
Search For:
Clear Search Box
Search in:
文章
Or hit Enter to replace search target
Or select another collection:
Search in:
文章
進階檢索
瀏覽查詢
This feature requires javascript
顯示結果:
查詢種類
criteria input
包含在我的檢索語句內
完全相同
顯示結果:
查詢種類 索引
criteria input
任何地方
題名
ISBN
ISSN
Show Results with:
題名
Show Results with:
任何地方
題名
ISBN
ISSN
This feature requires javascript
THE THREE PERMISSIONS: PRESIDENTIAL REMOVAL AND THE STATUTORY LIMITS OF AGENCY INDEPENDENCE
Manners, Jane ; Menand, Lev
Columbia law review, 2021-01, Vol.121 (1), p.1-80
[同儕審閱期刊]
可取得全文
引用
被引用
線上檢視
詳細格式
評論和標籤
相關文章推薦
FullText@NUTN
引用次數
This feature requires javascript
傳送到
加入個人書架
從個人書架中移除
E-mail
列印
永久連結
引用
EndNote
導出 RiS
This feature requires javascript
題名:
THE THREE PERMISSIONS: PRESIDENTIAL REMOVAL AND THE STATUTORY LIMITS OF AGENCY INDEPENDENCE
著者:
Manners, Jane
;
Menand, Lev
主題:
19th century
;
COMMON LAW
;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
;
Courts
;
Exceptions
;
Federal regulation
;
Government waste
;
Independence
;
Independent regulatory commissions
;
Legislators
;
Legislatures
;
MISCONDUCT
;
Misconduct in office
;
Pleasure
;
Political power
;
Politics
;
POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
;
Presidential powers
;
Presidents
;
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
;
REGULATION
;
Tenure
所屬期刊:
Columbia law review, 2021-01, Vol.121 (1), p.1-80
描述:
Seven words stand between the President and the heads of over a dozen “independent agencies”: inefficiency, neglect of duty, and malfeasance in office (INM). The President can remove the heads of these agencies for INM and only INM. But neither Congress nor the courts have defined INM and hence the extent of agency independence. Stepping into this void, some proponents of presidential power argue that INM allows the President to dismiss officials who do not follow presidential directives. Others contend that INM is unconstitutional because it prevents Presidents from fulfilling their duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed. This Article recovers the lost history of INM, explaining its origins and meaning, inverting our current understanding of its purpose, and rejecting both challenges to agency independence. It shows that INM provisions are not removal “protections” that prevent at-pleasure removal; they are removal permissions that authorize removal where it is otherwise prohibited by an officer’s term of years, a tenure long understood to bar executive removal for any reason. INM provisions are narrow exceptions to term tenures: Neglect of duty and malfeasance in office cash out an official’s failure to faithfully execute official duties, while inefficiency relates to government waste and ineptitude. INM provisions do not permit the President to remove agency heads for failing to follow presidential directives. But they do not clash with the Take Care Clause either, because even on an expansive reading of the clause, INM provisions authorize Presidents to remove unfaithful or incompetent officials.
出版者:
New York: Columbia Law Review Association, Inc
語言:
英文
識別號:
ISSN: 0010-1958
EISSN: 1945-2268
資源來源:
Academic Search Premier
Business Source Complete
Political Science Database
This feature requires javascript
This feature requires javascript
返回到檢索清單
This feature requires javascript
This feature requires javascript
正在檢索遠程資料庫,請稍等
查詢:
在
primo_central_multiple_fe
顯示現有記錄
This feature requires javascript
This feature requires javascript